Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games

  • Ola Rozenfeld
  • Moshe Tennenholtz
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4286)

Abstract

The study of congestion games is central to the interplay between computer science and game theory. However, most work in this context does not deal with possible deviations by coalitions of players, a significant issue one may wish to consider. In order to deal with this issue we study the existence of strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games. Our study of strong equilibrium deals with monotone-increasing congestion games, complementing the results obtained by Holzman and Law-Yone on monotone-decreasing congestion games. We then present a study of correlated-strong equilibrium for both decreasing and increasing monotone congestion games.

Keywords

Congestion Games Strong Equilibrium 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ola Rozenfeld
    • 1
  • Moshe Tennenholtz
    • 1
  1. 1.Technion–Israel Institute of TechnologyHaifaIsrael

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