Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games
- 731 Downloads
The study of congestion games is central to the interplay between computer science and game theory. However, most work in this context does not deal with possible deviations by coalitions of players, a significant issue one may wish to consider. In order to deal with this issue we study the existence of strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games. Our study of strong equilibrium deals with monotone-increasing congestion games, complementing the results obtained by Holzman and Law-Yone on monotone-decreasing congestion games. We then present a study of correlated-strong equilibrium for both decreasing and increasing monotone congestion games.
KeywordsCongestion Games Strong Equilibrium
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Anshelevich, E., Dasgupta, Kleinberg, J., Tardos, E., Wexler, T., Roughgarden, T.: The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. In: Proc. 45th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 59–73 (2004)Google Scholar
- 2.Aumann, R.J.: Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. In: Tucker, A.W., Luce, R.D. (eds.) Contribution to the Theory of Games. Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40, vol. IV, pp. 287–324 (1959)Google Scholar
- 6.Papadimitriou, C.H.: Algorithms, Games, and the Internet. In: Proc. 33rd ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pp. 749–753 (2001)Google Scholar
- 7.Rosenthal, R.W.: A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory 2, 65–67 (1973)Google Scholar
- 8.Roughgarden, T.: Selfish routing with atomic players. In: Proc. the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), Vancouver, Canada, pp. 973–974 (2005)Google Scholar