Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency

(Extended Abstract)
  • Moshe Babaioff
  • Michal Feldman
  • Noam Nisan
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4286)


We study a setting where a principal needs to motivate a team of agents whose combination of hidden efforts stochastically determines an outcome. In a companion paper we devise and study a basic “combinatorial agency” model for this setting, where the principal is restricted to inducing a pure Nash equilibrium. Here, we show that the principal may possibly gain from inducing a mixed equilibrium, but this gain can be bounded for various families of technologies (in particular if a technology has symmetric combinatorial structure). In addition, we present a sufficient condition under which mixed strategies yield no gain to the principal.


Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Success Function Optimal Contract 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Moshe Babaioff
    • 1
  • Michal Feldman
    • 2
  • Noam Nisan
    • 2
  1. 1.UC Berkeley School of Information 
  2. 2.School of Computer ScienceHebrew University of Jerusalem 

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