Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints

  • Tian-Ming Bu
  • Qi Qi
  • Aries Wei Sun
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/11944874_3

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4286)
Cite this paper as:
Bu TM., Qi Q., Sun A.W. (2006) Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints. In: Spirakis P., Mavronicolas M., Kontogiannis S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4286. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. The new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Suppose all the participators are rational, how to allocate the objects at what price so as to guarantee auctioneer’s high revenue, and how high it is.

We introduce a new kind of mechanisms called win-win mechanisms and present the notion of unconditional competitive auctions. A notably interesting property of win-win mechanisms is that each bidder’s self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present win-win mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are unconditional competitive under the situation of both limited and unlimited supply.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tian-Ming Bu
    • 1
  • Qi Qi
    • 2
  • Aries Wei Sun
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Intelligent Information Processing LaboratoryFudan UniversityShanghaiP.R. China
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceCity University of Hong KongKowloonHong Kong

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