Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints

  • Tian-Ming Bu
  • Qi Qi
  • Aries Wei Sun
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4286)


This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. The new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Suppose all the participators are rational, how to allocate the objects at what price so as to guarantee auctioneer’s high revenue, and how high it is.

We introduce a new kind of mechanisms called win-win mechanisms and present the notion of unconditional competitive auctions. A notably interesting property of win-win mechanisms is that each bidder’s self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present win-win mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are unconditional competitive under the situation of both limited and unlimited supply.


Nash Equilibrium Budget Constraint Competitive Ratio Random Partition Assignment Game 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tian-Ming Bu
    • 1
  • Qi Qi
    • 2
  • Aries Wei Sun
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Intelligent Information Processing LaboratoryFudan UniversityShanghaiP.R. China
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceCity University of Hong KongKowloonHong Kong

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