Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints
This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. The new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Suppose all the participators are rational, how to allocate the objects at what price so as to guarantee auctioneer’s high revenue, and how high it is.
We introduce a new kind of mechanisms called win-win mechanisms and present the notion of unconditional competitive auctions. A notably interesting property of win-win mechanisms is that each bidder’s self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present win-win mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are unconditional competitive under the situation of both limited and unlimited supply.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Budget Constraint Competitive Ratio Random Partition Assignment Game
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