Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems

  • Shuchi Chawla
  • Tim Roughgarden
  • Mukund Sundararajan
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/11944874_11

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4286)
Cite this paper as:
Chawla S., Roughgarden T., Sundararajan M. (2006) Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems. In: Spirakis P., Mavronicolas M., Kontogiannis S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4286. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Könemann, Leonardi, and Schäfer [14] gave a 2-budget-balanced and groupstrategyproof mechanism for Steiner forest cost-sharing problems. We prove that this mechanism also achieves an O(log2k)-approximation of the social cost, where k is the number of players. As a consequence, the KLS mechanism has the smallest-possible worst-case efficiency loss, up to constant factors, among all O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for such cost functions. We also extend our results to a more general network design problem.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shuchi Chawla
    • 1
  • Tim Roughgarden
    • 2
  • Mukund Sundararajan
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Wisconsin-MadisonMadisonUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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