Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems
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- Chawla S., Roughgarden T., Sundararajan M. (2006) Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems. In: Spirakis P., Mavronicolas M., Kontogiannis S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4286. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Könemann, Leonardi, and Schäfer  gave a 2-budget-balanced and groupstrategyproof mechanism for Steiner forest cost-sharing problems. We prove that this mechanism also achieves an O(log2k)-approximation of the social cost, where k is the number of players. As a consequence, the KLS mechanism has the smallest-possible worst-case efficiency loss, up to constant factors, among all O(1)-budget-balanced Moulin mechanisms for such cost functions. We also extend our results to a more general network design problem.
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