A Simple and Unified Method of Proving Indistinguishability

  • Mridul Nandi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4329)


Recently Bernstein [4] has provided a simpler proof of indistinguishability of CBC construction [3] which is giving insight of the construction. Indistinguishability of any function intuitively means that the function behaves very closely to a uniform random function. In this paper we make a unifying and simple approach to prove indistinguishability of many existing constructions. We first revisit Bernstein’s proof. Using this idea we can show a simpler proof of indistinguishability of a class of DAG based construction [8], XCBC [5], TMAC [9], OMAC [7] and PMAC [6]. We also provide a simpler proof for stronger bound of CBC [1] and a simpler proof of security of on-line Hash-CBC [2]. We note that there is a flaw in the security proof of Hash-CBC given in [2]. This paper will help to understand security analysis of indistinguishability of many constructions in a simpler way.


Output Function Input Function Random Function Simple Proof Sink Node 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mridul Nandi
    • 1
  1. 1.David R. Cheriton School of Computer ScienceUniversity of WaterlooCanada

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