KFC – The Krazy Feistel Cipher

  • Thomas Baignères
  • Matthieu Finiasz
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4284)


We introduce KFC, a block cipher based on a three round Feistel scheme. Each of the three round functions has an SPN-like structure for which we can either compute or bound the advantage of the best d-limited adaptive distinguisher, for any value of d. Using results from the decorrelation theory, we extend these results to the whole KFC construction. To the best of our knowledge, KFC is the first practical (in the sense that it can be implemented) block cipher to propose tight security proofs of resistance against large classes of attacks, including most classical cryptanalysis (such as linear and differential cryptanalysis, taking hull effect in consideration in both cases, higher order differential cryptanalysis, the boomerang attack, differential-linear cryptanalysis, and others).


Random Function Random Permutation Block Cipher Round Function Linear Cryptanalysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Baignères
    • 1
  • Matthieu Finiasz
    • 1
  1. 1.EPFLLausanneSwitzerland

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