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RCS: A Distributed Mechanism Against Link Flooding DDoS Attacks

  • Yong Cui
  • Lingjian Song
  • Ke Xu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3961)

Abstract

DoS/DDoS attacks especially the Link Flooding have exerted severe threat on Internet. In this paper we propose a novel mechanism called Rate Control System (RCS) against Link Flooding based on the correlation analysis of upper link flows. According to the feature of aggregate in DDoS attack, RCS takes DDoS attack problem as a way of flow control to simplify the situation and deploys the flow controller at the routers near the victims. As the key point of our mechanism, an algorithm is designed to differentiate the malicious packets and the normal ones and we classify the packets according to TCP flags in order to tell different flows apart. In addition we detect the malicious aggregate using correlation analysis to make clear the type and the location of the attack. Simulation results demonstrate the performance for detecting the Link Flooding DDoS attacks.

Keywords

Pass Rate Link Load USENIX Security Symposium Good Packet Packet Category 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yong Cui
    • 1
  • Lingjian Song
    • 1
  • Ke Xu
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and TechnologyTsinghua UniversityBeijingP.R. China

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