BGP Route Selection Notice

  • Wang Lijun
  • Xu Ke
  • Wu Jianping
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3961)


The present Internet is not trustworthy, partially because the routing system forwards packets only according to destination IP address. Forged packets with mendacious source IP address will also be brought to the destination, which can be utilized to compromise the destination machine. In this paper, we propose to enhance BGP by adding Route Selection Notice functionality. With BGP Route Selection Notice, Autonomous Systems can validate the authenticity of incoming IP packets and filter out improper packets to make routing infrastructure offer support to trustworthy service. BGP Route Selection Notice does not impair the routing function of BGP and with proper design its bandwidth cost and convergence delay is acceptable which is proved by our simulation.


Vertex Cover Convergence Time Address Space Route Selection Source Address 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wang Lijun
    • 1
  • Xu Ke
    • 1
  • Wu Jianping
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and TechnologyTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina

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