Examining the DoS Resistance of HIP

  • Suratose Tritilanunt
  • Colin Boyd
  • Ernest Foo
  • Juan Manuel González Nieto
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4277)


We examine DoS resistance of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) and discuss a technique to deny legitimate services. To demonstrate the experiment, we implement a formal model of HIP based on Timed Petri Nets and use a simulation approach provided in CPN Tools to achieve a formal analysis. By integrating adjustable puzzle difficulty, HIP can mitigate the effect of DoS attacks. However, the inability to protect against coordinated adversaries on a hash-based puzzle causes the responder to be susceptible to DoS attacks at the identity verification phase. As a result, we propose an enhanced approach by employing a time-lock puzzle instead of a hash-based scheme. Once the time-lock puzzle is adopted, the effect of coordinated attacks will be removed and the throughput from legitimate users will return to the desirable level.


Host Identity Protocol Adversarial Strategy Puzzle Solution Client Puzzle Bogus Message 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Suratose Tritilanunt
    • 1
  • Colin Boyd
    • 1
  • Ernest Foo
    • 1
  • Juan Manuel González Nieto
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security InstituteQueensland University of TechnologyBrisbaneAustralia

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