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Sound Computational Interpretation of Symbolic Hashes in the Standard Model

  • Flavio D. Garcia
  • Peter van Rossum
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4266)

Abstract

This paper provides one more step towards bridging the gap between the formal and computational approaches to the verification of cryptographic protocols. We extend the well-known Abadi-Rogaway logic with probabilistic hashes and we give a precise semantic interpretation to it using Canetti’s oracle hashes. These are probabilistic polynomialtime hashes that hide all partial information. Finally, we show that this interpretation is computationally sound.

Keywords

Hash Function Encryption Scheme Random Oracle Security Parameter Cryptographic Operation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Flavio D. Garcia
    • 1
  • Peter van Rossum
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Computing and Information SciencesRadboud University NijmegenThe Netherlands

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