Evolution of Cooperation Using Random Pairing on Social Networks

  • Sihai Zhang
  • Shuangping Chen
  • Xufa Wang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4247)


We studied the evolution of cooperation on social networks based on personal reputation using random pairing rule. Small-world networks and scale-free networks are used as practical network model. The iterated prisoner’s dilemma game are adopted as theorotical tool in which players are paired according to the network structure to play the ONE-SHOT prisoner’s dilemma game. Computer simulation shows that TIT-FOR-TAT-like strategy pattern will emerge from initial enviroments and cooperation can be maintained even in social networks when players have little chance to play continuous repeated games.


Social Network Game Model Public Good Game Random Pairing Reciprocal Altruism 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sihai Zhang
    • 1
  • Shuangping Chen
    • 1
  • Xufa Wang
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and TechnologyUniversity of Science and Technology of ChinaAnhuiChina

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