Capture Resilient ElGamal Signature Protocols
One of the fundamental problems of public key cryptography is protecting the private key. Private keys are too long to be remembered by the user, and storing them in the device which performs the private key operation is insecure as long as the device is subject to capture. In this paper, we propose server-assisted protocols for the ElGamal signature scheme which make the system capture resilient in the sense that the security of the system is not compromised even if the signature device is captured. The protocols also have a key disabling feature which allows a user to disable the device’s private key in case both the device and the password of the user are compromised simultaneously.
KeywordsSmart Card Message Authentication Code Legitimate User Random Oracle Model Signature Protocol
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