Capture Resilient ElGamal Signature Protocols

  • Hüseyin Acan
  • Kamer Kaya
  • Ali Aydın Selçuk
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4263)


One of the fundamental problems of public key cryptography is protecting the private key. Private keys are too long to be remembered by the user, and storing them in the device which performs the private key operation is insecure as long as the device is subject to capture. In this paper, we propose server-assisted protocols for the ElGamal signature scheme which make the system capture resilient in the sense that the security of the system is not compromised even if the signature device is captured. The protocols also have a key disabling feature which allows a user to disable the device’s private key in case both the device and the password of the user are compromised simultaneously.


Smart Card Message Authentication Code Legitimate User Random Oracle Model Signature Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hüseyin Acan
    • 1
  • Kamer Kaya
    • 2
  • Ali Aydın Selçuk
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsBilkent University 
  2. 2.Department of Computer EngineeringBilkent University 

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