Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks

With an Application to Block Ciphers
  • F. -X. Standaert
  • E. Peeters
  • C. Archambeau
  • J. -J. Quisquater
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4249)


In this paper, we consider a recently introduced framework that investigates physically observable implementations from a theoretical point of view. The model allows quantifying the effect of practically relevant leakage functions with a combination of security and information theoretic metrics. More specifically, we apply our evaluation methodology to an exemplary block cipher. We first consider a Hamming weight leakage function and evaluate the efficiency of two commonly investigated countermeasures, namely noise addition and masking. Then, we show that the proposed methodology allows capturing certain non-trivial intuitions, e.g. about the respective effectiveness of these countermeasures. Finally, we justify the need of combined metrics for the evaluation, comparison and understanding of side-channel attacks.


Mutual Information Block Cipher Secret State Average Success Rate Correlation Power Analysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • F. -X. Standaert
    • 1
  • E. Peeters
    • 1
  • C. Archambeau
    • 1
  • J. -J. Quisquater
    • 1
  1. 1.UCL Crypto GroupLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium

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