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Read-Proof Hardware from Protective Coatings

  • Pim Tuyls
  • Geert-Jan Schrijen
  • Boris Škorić
  • Jan van Geloven
  • Nynke Verhaegh
  • Rob Wolters
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4249)

Abstract

In cryptography it is assumed that adversaries only have black box access to the secret keys of honest parties. In real life, however, the black box approach is not sufficient because attackers have access to many physical means that enable them to derive information on the secret keys. In order to limit the attacker’s ability to read out secret information, the concept of Algorithmic Tamper Proof (ATP) security is needed as put forth by Gennaro, Lysyanskaya, Malkin, Micali and Rabin. An essential component to achieve ATP security is read-proof hardware. In this paper, we develop an implementation of read-proof hardware that is resistant against invasive attacks. The construction is based on a hardware and a cryptographic part. The hardware consists of a protective coating that contains a lot of randomness. By performing measurements on the coating a fingerprint is derived. The cryptographic part consists of a Fuzzy Extractor that turns this fingerprint into a secure key. Hence no key is present in the non-volatile memory of the device. It is only constructed at the time when needed, and deleted afterwards. A practical implementation of the hardware and the cryptographic part is given. Finally, experimental evidence is given that an invasive attack on an IC equipped with this coating, reveals only a small amount of information on the key.

Keywords

Protective Coating Gray Code Physical Unclonable Function Honest Party Helper Data 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pim Tuyls
    • 1
  • Geert-Jan Schrijen
    • 1
  • Boris Škorić
    • 1
  • Jan van Geloven
    • 1
  • Nynke Verhaegh
    • 1
  • Rob Wolters
    • 1
  1. 1.Philips Research LaboratoriesThe Netherlands

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