Advertisement

An Intelligent and Efficient Traitor Tracing for Ubiquitous Environments

  • Deok-Gyu Lee
  • Seo Il Kang
  • Im-Yeong Lee
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4252)

Abstract

Broadcast encryption has been applied to transmit digital information such as multimedia, software and paid TV programs on the open networks. One of key factors in the broadcast encryption is that only previously authorized users can access the digital information. If the broadcast message is sent, first of all, the privileged users will decode the session key by using his or her personal key, which the user got previously. The user will get the digital information through this session key. As shown above, the user will obtain messages or session keys using the keys transmitted from a broadcaster, which process requires effective ways for the broadcaster to generate and distribute keys. In addition, when a user wants to withdraw or sign up, an effective process to renew a key is required. It is also necessary to chase and check users’ malicious activities or attacking others. This paper presents a method called Traitor Tracing to solve all these problems. Traitor tracing can check attackers and trace them. It also utilizes a proactive scheme for each user to have effective and intelligence renewal cycle to generate keys.

Keywords

Suggested Method Content Provider Digital Information Broadcast Message Ubiquitous Environment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Fiat, A., Naor, M.: Broadcast Encryption. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 480–491. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Narayana, A.: Practical Pay TV Schemes. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Seberry, J. (eds.) ACISP 2003. LNCS, vol. 2727, Springer, Heidelberg (2003)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Blundo, C., Mattos, L.A.F., Stinson, D.R.: Generalized Beimel-Chor schemes for Broadcast Enryption and Interactive Key Distribution. Theoretical Computer Science 200, 313–334 (1998)MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Blundo, C., Mattos, L.A.F., Stinson, D.R.: Trade-offs between Communication and Storage in Unconditionally Secure Schemes for Broadcast Encryption and Interactive Key Distribution. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 387–400. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Blundo, C., Cresti, A.: Space Requirements for Broadcast Encryption. In: De Santis, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1994. LNCS, vol. 950, pp. 287–298. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Beaver, D., So, N.: Global, Unpredictable Bit Generation without Broadcast. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 424–434. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Lee, D.H., Kim, H.J., Lim, J.I.: Efficient Public-Key Traitor Tracing in Provably Secure Broadcast Encryption with Unlimited Revocation Capability. In: Ko-reaCrypto 2002 (2003)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Boneh, D., Franklin, M.K.: An Efficient Public Key Traitor Scheme (Extended Abstract). In: Wiener, M.J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 338–353. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Halevy, D., Shamir, A.: The LSD Broadcast Encryption Scheme. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 47–60. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Gracia, I., Martin, S., Padro, C.: Improving the Trade-off Between Storage and Communication in Broadcast Encryption Schemes (2001)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Garay, J.A., Staddon, J., Wool, A.: Long-Lived Broadcast Encryption. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 333–352. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Abdalla, M., Shavitt, Y., Wool, A.: Towards Marking Broadcast Encryption Practical. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 8(4), 443–454 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Dodis, Y., Fazio, N.: Public Key Broadcast Encryption for Stateless Receivers. In: ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management (2002)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Ostrovsky, R., youg, M.: How to withstand mobile virus attacks. In: Proc. 10th ACM symp. on principles of Distributed Computation, pp. 51–61 (1991)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Herzberg, H.K.A., Jarecki, S., Yung, M.: Proactive Secret Sharing or: How to Cope with Perpetual Leakage. In: Coppersmith, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 1995. LNCS, vol. 963, pp. 339–352. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Deok-Gyu Lee
    • 1
  • Seo Il Kang
    • 1
  • Im-Yeong Lee
    • 1
  1. 1.Multimedia-HallAsan-si Choongchungnam-doKorea

Personalised recommendations