Fault Analysis of DPA-Resistant Algorithms

  • Frederic Amiel
  • Christophe Clavier
  • Michael Tunstall
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4236)


In this paper several attacks are presented that allow information to be derived on faults injected at the beginning of cryptographic algorithm implementations that use Boolean masking to defend against Differential Power Analysis (DPA). These attacks target the initialisation functions that are used to enable the algorithm to be protected, allowing a fault attack even in the presence of round redundancy. A description of the experiments leading to the development of these attacks is also given.


Smart Card Advanced Encryption Standard Fault Injection Fault Analysis Random Delay 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frederic Amiel
    • 1
  • Christophe Clavier
    • 1
  • Michael Tunstall
    • 2
  1. 1.Security LabsGemaltoLa CiotatFrance
  2. 2.Smart Card Centre, Information Security Group, Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEgham, SurreyUK

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