Advertisement

Private Policy Negotiation

  • Klaus Kursawe
  • Gregory Neven
  • Pim Tuyls
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4107)

Abstract

With the increasing importance of correctly handling privacy-sensitive data, significant work has been put in expressing and enforcing privacy policies. Less work has been done however on negotiating a privacy policy, especially if the negctiation process itself is considered privacy-sensitive. In this paper, we present a formal definition of the mutually privacy-preserving policy negotiation problem, i.e. the problem of negotiating what data will be revealed under what conditions, while no party learns anything about the other parties’ preferences other than the outcome of the negotiation.

We validate the definition by providing a reference solution using two-party computation techniques based on homomorphic encryption systems. Based on an evaluation of the efficiency of our protocol in terms of computation, bandwidth and communication rounds, we conclude that our solution is practically feasible for simple policies or high-bandwidth communication channels.

Keywords

Policy Negotiation Homomorphic Encryption Boolean Circuit Privacy Preference Communication Round 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Abadi, M., Feigenbaum, J.: Secure circuit evaluation. J. Cryptology 2(1), 1–12 (1990)MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Al-Riyami, S.S., Malone-Lee, J., Smart, N.P.: Escrow-free encryption supporting cryptographic workflow. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report, 2004/258 (2004), available from http://eprint.iacr.org/
  3. 3.
    Backes, M., Karjoth, G., Bagga, W., Schunter, M.: Efficient comparison of enterprise privacy policies. In: ACM SAC 2004, pp. 375–382. ACM Press, New York (2004)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Bagga, W., Molva, R.: Policy-based cryptography and applications. In: S. Patrick, A., Yung, M. (eds.) FC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3570, pp. 72–87. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Barth, A., Mitchell, J.C.: Enterprise privacy promises and enforcement. In: WITS 2005: Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security, pp. 58–66. ACM Press, New York (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Boneh, D., Goh, E.-J., Nissim, K.: Evaluating 2-DNF formulas on ciphertexts. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) TCC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3378, pp. 325–341. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Camenisch, J., Van Herreweghen, E.: Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system. In: Proc. of the 9th CCS, pp. 21–30. ACM Press, New York (2002)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Cleve, R.: Limits on the security of coin flips when half the processors are faulty. In: Proc. of the 18th ACM STOC, pp. 364–369. ACM Press, New York (1986)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Cramer, R., Damgård, I., Nielsen, J.B.: Multiparty computation from threshold homomorphic encryption. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 280–300. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Damgård, I., Nielsen, J.B.: Universally composable efficient multiparty computation from threshold homomorphic encryption. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 565–582. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Desmedt, Y., Frankel, Y.: Threshold cryptosystems. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 307–315. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Díaz, C., et al.: Towards measuring anonymity. In: Dingledine, R., Syverson, P.F. (eds.) PET 2002. LNCS, vol. 2482, Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Franklin, M.K., Haber, S.: Joint encryption and message-efficient secure computation. J. Cryptology 9(4), 217–232 (1996)MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Freedman, M.J., Nissim, K., Pinkas, B.: Efficient private matching and set intersection. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 1–19. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Gennaro, R., et al.: Secure distributed key generation for discrete-log based cryptosystems. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 295–310. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Gennaro, R., et al.: Secure applications of Pedersen’s distributed key generation protocol. In: Joye, M. (ed.) CT-RSA 2003. LNCS, vol. 2612, pp. 373–390. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game or a completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In: Proc. of the 19th ACM STOC, pp. 218–229. ACM Press, New York (1987)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Jakobsson, M., Juels, A.: Mix and match: Secure function evaluation via ciphertexts. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 346–358. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Mont, M.C., Pearson, S., Bramhall, P.: Towards accountable management of identity and privacy: Sticky policies and enforceable tracing services. In: DEXA 2003 Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA 2003), pp. 377–382. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Schoenmakers, B., Tuyls, P.: Practical two-party computation based on the conditional gate. In: Lee, P.J. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3329, pp. 119–136. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Seamons, K.E., Winslett, M., Yu, T.: Limiting the disclosure of access control policies during automated trust negotiation. In: NDSS 2001, The Internet Society (2001)Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Steinbrecher, S., Köpsell, S.: Modelling unlinkability. In: Dingledine, R. (ed.) PET 2003. LNCS, vol. 2760, Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    W3C. The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) specification (2002), http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/
  24. 24.
    Yao, A.C.-C.: Protocols for secure computations. In: IEEE, editor, Proc. of the 23rd FOCS, pp. 160–164. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (1982)Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Yu, T., Winslett, M., Seamons, K.E.: Supporting structured credentials and sensitive policies through interoperable strategies for automated trust negotiation. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 6, 1–42 (2003)MATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Klaus Kursawe
    • 1
    • 2
  • Gregory Neven
    • 1
    • 3
  • Pim Tuyls
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept.of Electrical EngineeringKatholieke Universiteit LeuvenHeverleeBelgium
  2. 2.Philips ResearchEindhovenThe Netherlands
  3. 3.Département d’InformatiqueEcole Normale SupérieureParisFrance

Personalised recommendations