An Analysis of the 2004 Supply Chain Management Trading Agent Competition

  • Christopher Kiekintveld
  • Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
  • Michael P. Wellman
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3937)


We present and analyze results from the 2004 Trading Agent Competition supply chain management scenario. We identify behavioral differences between the agents that contributed to their performance in the competition. In the market for components, strategic early procurement remained an important factor despite rule changes from the previous year. We present a new experimental analysis of the impact of the rule changes on incentives for early procurement. In the finals, a novel strategy designed to block other agent’s access to suppliers at the start of the game was pivotal. Some agents did not respond effectively to this strategy and were badly hurt by their inability to get crucial components. Among the top three agents, average selling prices in the market for finished goods were the decisive difference. Our analysis shows that supply and demand were key factors in determining overall market prices, and that some agents were more adept than others at exploiting advantageous market conditions.


Nash Equilibrium Supply Chain Management Storage Cost Rule Change Early Procurement 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christopher Kiekintveld
    • 1
  • Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
    • 1
  • Michael P. Wellman
    • 1
  1. 1.Artificial Intelligence LaboratoryUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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