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Market-Based Allocation with Indivisible Bids

  • L. Julian Schvartzman
  • Michael P. Wellman
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3937)

Abstract

We study multi-unit double auctions accepting bids with indivisibility constraints. We propose different price-quote policies and study their influence on the efficiency of market-based allocation. Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding. These benefits are highly sensitive to the form of price quote provided, indicating interesting tradeoffs in communication and allocation efficiency.

Keywords

Unit Price Order Book Combinatorial Auction Auction Mechanism Integer Linear Programming Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • L. Julian Schvartzman
    • 1
  • Michael P. Wellman
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science & EngineeringUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA

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