Abstract
There are restrictions of complete rationality and information symmetry, which is difficult to work in reality, in the traditional game theory. However, the evolutionary game theory, based on bounded rationality, can compensate these defects. In this paper, we set up an asymmetric model of the evolutionary game between a supplier and a retailer with asymmetric information. The evolutionary stable strategies and their premises were obtained with the replicator dynamics mechanism. The analysis in this paper has significance of explanation and direction for the supply chain management.
This work is supported by the NSFC under the project 60374023.
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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Min, Z., Fei-qi, D. (2006). Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric Game Between a Supplier and a Retailer. In: Jiao, L., Wang, L., Gao, X., Liu, J., Wu, F. (eds) Advances in Natural Computation. ICNC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4222. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11881223_57
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11881223_57
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