Coalition Formation in P2P File Sharing Systems
P2P file sharing systems are distributed systems consisting of interconnected nodes able to organize themselves in networks, with the purpose of sharing content. Recent empirical studies have shown that they suffer from freeloaders, that is, peers that consume many more resources or content than they contribute. In this paper we propose a coalition formation based incentive mechanism for P2P file sharing systems, that improves the system performance for the coalition participant peers. In addition, it discourages free-loader like behavior. The mechanism presents a formal approach to the problem based on game theory that takes into account the rational and self-interested behavior of the peers.
KeywordsCoalition Formation Sharing System Download Time Upload Bandwidth Reserved Bandwidth
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