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Verifying a Chipcard-Based Biometric Identification Protocol in VSE

  • Lassaad Cheikhrouhou
  • Georg Rock
  • Werner Stephan
  • Matthias Schwan
  • Gunter Lassmann
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4166)

Abstract

In this paper we describe our experiences in specifying and verifying a complex cryptographic protocol actually used in industry that has been developed for the area of chipcard based biometric identification systems. The main emphasis was placed on authenticity, integrity and confidentiality properties. The formal analysis even led to several simplifying modifications of the protocol that facilitate the implementation, yet maintaining the protocol security properties we considered. The formal analysis is based on an inductive approach performed with the help of VSE (Verification Support Environment). The heuristic based proof automation techniques realized in VSE result in an average grade of automation of 80 percent. Thus, VSE provides substantial support for the specification and verification of cryptographic protocols.

Keywords

Security Protocol Mutual Authentication Message Authentication Code Cryptographic Protocol Protocol Step 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lassaad Cheikhrouhou
    • 1
  • Georg Rock
    • 1
  • Werner Stephan
    • 1
  • Matthias Schwan
    • 2
  • Gunter Lassmann
    • 2
  1. 1.German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI GmbH)SaarbrückenGermany
  2. 2.T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbHBerlinGermany

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