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Time-Bounded Task-PIOAs: A Framework for Analyzing Security Protocols

  • Ran Canetti
  • Ling Cheung
  • Dilsun Kaynar
  • Moses Liskov
  • Nancy Lynch
  • Olivier Pereira
  • Roberto Segala
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4167)

Abstract

We present the Time-Bounded Task-PIOA modeling framework, an extension of the Probabilistic I/O Automata (PIOA) framework that is intended to support modeling and verification of security protocols. Time-Bounded Task-PIOAs directly model probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior, partial-information adversarial scheduling, and time-bounded computation. Together, these features are adequate to support modeling of key aspects of security protocols, including secrecy requirements and limitations on the knowledge and computational power of adversarial parties. They also support security protocol verification, using methods that are compatible with informal approaches used in the computational cryptography research community. We illustrate the use of our framework by outlining a proof of functional correctness and security properties for a well-known Oblivious Transfer protocol.

Keywords

Task Schedule Security Protocol Cryptographic Protocol Trace Distribution Oblivious Transfer 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ran Canetti
    • 1
    • 3
  • Ling Cheung
    • 2
    • 3
  • Dilsun Kaynar
    • 3
  • Moses Liskov
    • 4
  • Nancy Lynch
    • 3
  • Olivier Pereira
    • 5
  • Roberto Segala
    • 6
  1. 1.IBM T.J. Watson Center and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
  2. 2.Radboud University of Nijmegen 
  3. 3.Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
  4. 4.The College of William and Mary 
  5. 5.Université Catholique de Louvain 
  6. 6.Università di Verona 

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