Abstract
We present the Time-Bounded Task-PIOA modeling framework, an extension of the Probabilistic I/O Automata (PIOA) framework that is intended to support modeling and verification of security protocols. Time-Bounded Task-PIOAs directly model probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior, partial-information adversarial scheduling, and time-bounded computation. Together, these features are adequate to support modeling of key aspects of security protocols, including secrecy requirements and limitations on the knowledge and computational power of adversarial parties. They also support security protocol verification, using methods that are compatible with informal approaches used in the computational cryptography research community. We illustrate the use of our framework by outlining a proof of functional correctness and security properties for a well-known Oblivious Transfer protocol.
Canetti is supported by NSF CyberTrust Grant #430450; Cheung by DFG/NWO bilateral cooperation project 600.050.011.01 Validation of Stochastic Systems (VOSS); Kaynar and Lynch by DARPA/AFOSR MURI Award #F49620-02-1-0325, MURI AFOSR Award #SA2796PO 1-0000243658, NSF Awards #CCR-0326277 and #CCR-0121277, and USAF, AFRL Award #FA9550-04-1-0121; Pereira by the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS); and Segala by MURST project Constraint-based Verification of reactive systems (CoVer).
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Canetti, R. et al. (2006). Time-Bounded Task-PIOAs: A Framework for Analyzing Security Protocols. In: Dolev, S. (eds) Distributed Computing. DISC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4167. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11864219_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11864219_17
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