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Private Information Retrieval Using Trusted Hardware

  • Shuhong Wang
  • Xuhua Ding
  • Robert H. Deng
  • Feng Bao
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4189)

Abstract

Many theoretical PIR (Private Information Retrieval) constructions have been proposed in the past years. Though information theoretically secure, most of them are impractical to deploy due to the prohibitively high communication and computation complexity. The recent trend in outsourcing databases fuels the research on practical PIR schemes. In this paper, we propose a new PIR system by making use of trusted hardware. Our system is proven to be information theoretically secure. Furthermore, we derive the computation complexity lower bound for hardware-based PIR schemes and show that our construction meets the lower bounds for both the communication and computation costs, respectively.

Keywords

Data Item Computation Cost Random Permutation Block Cipher Access Pattern 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shuhong Wang
    • 1
  • Xuhua Ding
    • 1
  • Robert H. Deng
    • 1
  • Feng Bao
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Information SystemsSMU 
  2. 2.Institute for Infocomm ResearchSingapore

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