Assessment of a Vulnerability in Iterative Servers Enabling Low-Rate DoS Attacks

  • Gabriel Maciá-Fernández
  • Jesús E. Díaz-Verdejo
  • Pedro García-Teodoro
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4189)


In this work, a vulnerability in iterative servers is described and exploited. The vulnerability is related to the possibility of acquiring some statistics about the time between two consecutive service responses generated by the server under the condition that the server has always requests to serve. By exploiting this knowledge, an intruder is able to carry out a DoS attack characterized by a relatively low-rate traffic destined to the server. Besides the presentation of the vulnerability, an implementation of the attack has been simulated and tested in a real environment. The results obtained show an important impact in the performance of the service provided by the server to legitimate users (DoS attack) while a low effort, in terms of volume of generated traffic, is necessary for the attacker. Besides, this attack compares favourably with a naive (brute-force) attack with the same traffic rate. Therefore, the proposed attack would easily pass through most of current IDSs, designed to detect high volumes of traffic.


Service Time Intrusion Detection System Round Trip Time Legitimate User Request Packet 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gabriel Maciá-Fernández
    • 1
  • Jesús E. Díaz-Verdejo
    • 1
  • Pedro García-Teodoro
    • 1
  1. 1.Dep. of Signal Theory, Telematics and CommunicationsUniversity of GranadaGranada(Spain)

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