Advertisement

Limits of the BRSIM/UC Soundness of Dolev-Yao Models with Hashes

  • Michael Backes
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
  • Michael Waidner
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4189)

Abstract

Automated tools such as model checkers and theorem provers for the analysis of security protocols typically abstract from cryptography by Dolev-Yao models, i.e., abstract term algebras replace the real cryptographic operations. Recently it was shown that in essence this approach is cryptographically sound for certain operations like signing and encryption. The strongest results show this in the sense of blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM)/UC with only small changes to both Dolev-Yao models and natural implementations. This notion essentially means the preservation of arbitrary security properties under active attacks in arbitrary protocol environments.

We show that it is impossible to extend the strong BRSIM/UC results to usual Dolev-Yao models of hash functions in the general case. These models treat hash functions as free operators of the term algebra. This result does not depend on any restriction of the real hash function; even probabilistic hashing is covered. In contrast, we show that these models are sound in the same strict sense in the random oracle model of cryptography. For the standard model of cryptography, we also discuss several conceivable restrictions and extensions to the Dolev-Yao models and classify them into possible and impossible cases in the strong BRSIM/UC sense.

Keywords

Hash Function Random Oracle Ideal Functionality Impossibility Result Random Oracle Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Abadi, M., Jürjens, J.: Formal eavesdropping and its computational interpretation. In: Kobayashi, N., Pierce, B.C. (eds.) TACS 2001. LNCS, vol. 2215, pp. 82–94. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Abadi, M., Rogaway, P.: Reconciling two views of cryptography: The computational soundness of formal encryption. In: Watanabe, O., Hagiya, M., Ito, T., van Leeuwen, J., Mosses, P.D. (eds.) TCS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1872, pp. 3–22. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Backes, M.: A cryptographically sound dolev-yao style security proof of the otway-rees protocol. In: Samarati, P., Ryan, P.Y.A., Gollmann, D., Molva, R. (eds.) ESORICS 2004. LNCS, vol. 3193, pp. 89–108. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Backes, M., Dürmuth, M.: A cryptographically sound Dolev-Yao style security proof of an electronic payment system. In: Proc. 18th IEEE CSFW, pp. 78–93 (2005)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B.: A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol. Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 22(10), 2075–2086 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B.: Symmetric encryption in a simulatable Dolev-Yao style cryptographic library. In: Proc. 17th IEEE CSFW, pp. 204–218 (2004)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B.: Limits of the cryptographic realization of dolev-yao-style XOR. In: di Vimercati, S.d.C., Syverson, P.F., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3679, pp. 178–196. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: A composable cryptographic library with nested operations. In: Proc. 10th ACM CCS, pp. 220–230 (2003)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: Symmetric authentication within a simulatable cryptographic library. In: Snekkenes, E., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2808, pp. 271–290. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: Limits of the Reactive Simulatability/UC of Dolev-Yao models with hashes. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2006/068 (February 2006)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Basin, D., Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: OFMC: A symbolic model checker for security protocols. Intern. Journal of Information Security (2004)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In: Proc. 1st ACM CCS, pp. 62–73 (1993)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Blanchet, B.: An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on Prolog rules. In: Proc. 14th IEEE CSFW, pp. 82–96 (2001)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Blanchet, B.: A computationally sound mechanized prover for security protocols. In: Proc. 27th IEEE Symp. on Security & Privacy, pp. 140–154 (2006)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Canetti, R.: Towards realizing random oracles: Hash functions that hide all partial information. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 455–469. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Canetti, R.: Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In: Proc. 42nd IEEE FOCS, pp. 136–145 (2001)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Canetti, R., Fischlin, M.: Universally composable commitments. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 19–40. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Canetti, R., Herzog, J.C.: Universally composable symbolic analysis of mutual authentication and key-exchange protocols. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.) TCC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 380–403. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Universally composable notions of key exchange and secure channels. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 337–351. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Canetti, R., Micciancio, D., Reingold, O.: Perfectly one-way probabilistic hash functions. In: Proc. 30th ACM STOC, pp. 131–140 (1998)Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Datta, A., Derek, A., Mitchell, J.C., Ramanathan, A., Scedrov, A.: Games and the impossibility of realizable ideal functionality. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.) TCC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 360–379. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Datta, A., Derek, A., Mitchell, J.C., Shmatikov, V., Turuani, M.: Probabilistic polynomial-time semantics for a protocol security logic. In: Caires, L., Italiano, G.F., Monteiro, L., Palamidessi, C., Yung, M. (eds.) ICALP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3580, pp. 16–29. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    Dolev, D., Yao, A.C.: On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 29(2), 198–208 (1983)CrossRefMathSciNetMATHGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Garcia, F.D., van Rossum, P.: Sound computational interpretation of formal hashes. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2006/014 (January 2006)Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Hofheinz, D., Müller-Quade, J.: Universally composable commitments using random oracles. In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 58–76. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Impagliazzo, R., Kapron, B.M.: Logics for reasoning about cryptographic constructions. In: Proc. 44th IEEE FOCS, pp. 372–381 (2003)Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Laud, P.: Semantics and program analysis of computationally secure information flow. In: Sands, D. (ed.) ESOP 2001. LNCS, vol. 2028, pp. 77–91. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. 28.
    Laud, P.: Symmetric encryption in automatic analyses for confidentiality against active adversaries. In: Proc. 25th IEEE Symp. on Security & Privacy, pp. 71–85 (2004)Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Laud, P.: Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library. In: Proc. 12th ACM CCS, pp. 26–35 (2005)Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Merritt, M.: Cryptographic Protocols. PhD thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology (1983)Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Micciancio, D., Warinschi, B.: Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries. In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 133–151. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. 32.
    Mitchell, J., Mitchell, M., Scedrov, A.: A linguistic characterization of bounded oracle computation and probabilistic polynomial time. In: Proc. 39th FOCS, pp. 725–733 (1998)Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    Mitchell, J., Mitchell, M., Scedrov, A., Teague, V.: A probabilistic polynominal-time process calculus for analysis of cryptographic protocols. ENTCS 47, 1–31 (2001)Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Paulson, L.: The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Journal of Cryptology 6(1), 85–128 (1998)Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems. In: Proc. 7th ACM CCS, pp. 245–254 (2000)Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: A model for asynchronous reactive systems and its application to secure message transmission. In: Proc. 22nd IEEE Symp. on S & P, pp. 184–200 (2001)Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    Sprenger, C., Backes, M., Basin, D., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: Cryptographically sound theorem proving. In: Proc. 19th IEEE CSFW (to appear, 2006)Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    Yao, A.C.: Theory and applications of trapdoor functions. In: Proc. 23rd FOCS, pp. 80–91 (1982)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Backes
    • 1
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
    • 2
  • Michael Waidner
    • 2
  1. 1.Saarland UniversitySaarbrückenGermany
  2. 2.Zurich Research LabIBMSwitzerland

Personalised recommendations