Prêt à Voter with Re-encryption Mixes

  • P Y A Ryan
  • S A Schneider
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4189)


We present a number of enhancements to the voter verifiable election scheme Prêt à Voter [CRS05]. Firstly, we propose a mechanism for the distributed construction by a set of independent clerks of the ballot forms. This construction leads to proto-ballot forms with the candidate list encrypted and ensures that only a collusion of all the clerks could determine the cryptographic seeds or the onion/candidate list association. This eliminates the need to trust a single authority to keep this information secret. Furthermore, it allows the on-demand decryption and printing of the ballot forms, so eliminating chain of custody issues and the chain voting style attacks against encrypted receipt schemes identified in [RP05].

The ballot forms proposed here use ElGamal randomised encryption so enabling the use of re-encryption mixes for the anonymising tabulation phase in place of the decryption mixes. This has a number of advantages over the RSA decryption mixes used previously: tolerance against failure of any of the mix tellers, full mixing of terms over the Z p * space and enabling the mixes and audits to be fully independently rerun if necessary.


Candidate List Vote Protocol Single Authority Trust Assumption Single Transferable Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • P Y A Ryan
    • 1
  • S A Schneider
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Newcastle 
  2. 2.University of Surrey 

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