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The Dancing Bear: A New Way of Composing Ciphers

  • Ross Anderson
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3957)

Abstract

This note presents a new way of composing cryptographic primitives which makes some novel combinations possible. For example, one can do threshold decryption using standard block ciphers, or using an arbitrary mix of different decryption algorithms – such as any three keys out of two AES keys, a 3DES key, an RSA key and a one-time pad. We also provide a new way to combine different types of primitive, such as encryption and signature. For example, Alice can construct a convertible signature that only Bob can verify, but which he can make world-verifiable using an AES key. We can incorporate even more exotic primitives, such as micropayments and puzzles, into compound constructs.

Previously, there had been two basic ways to combine cryptographic primitives. One could either design a compound primitive, perhaps using the homomorphic properties of discrete exponentiation, or one could embed several primitives into a protocol. Neither is ideal for all applications, and both have been extremely vulnerable to design errors. We provide a third construction that also allows the designer to do new things. We show, for example, how to incorporate cyclic dominance into a cryptographic mechanism, and how it might be used in a digital election scheme. Our new construction not only complements existing ways of composing crypto primitives; it also has the virtue of simplicity.

Keywords

Block Cipher Stream Cipher Cryptographic Primitive Homomorphic Property Fast Software Encryption 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ross Anderson
    • 1
  1. 1.Cambridge UniversityUK

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