Accountable Privacy

  • Mike Burmester
  • Yvo Desmedt
  • Rebecca N. Wright
  • Alec Yasinsac
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3957)


As the Internet has gained widespread use, and advanced technologies such as high-speed multi-media technologies and automated digital monitoring have become a reality, privacy is at the greatest risk of all time. At the same time, sophisticated threats from hackers, terrorists, thieves, and others that would abuse privacy highlight the need to find technologies that provide some accountability. However, the goals of accountability and of privacy appear to be in contradiction: accountability tends to be about determining which entities committed which actions, while privacy seeks to hide this information.

In this paper, we discuss the apparent conflict that exists between privacy and accountability. We survey some of the issues in privacy and in accountability and highlight research directions for balancing the needs of both.


Block Cipher Blind Signature Secret Sharing Scheme Electronic Vote Broadcast Encryption 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mike Burmester
    • 1
  • Yvo Desmedt
    • 1
  • Rebecca N. Wright
    • 2
  • Alec Yasinsac
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceStevens Institute of TechnologyHobokenUSA

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