Sovereign Information Sharing Among Malicious Partners

  • Stefan Böttcher
  • Sebastian Obermeier
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4165)


A secure calculation of common data RS without disclosing R or S is useful for many applications and has been widely studied. However, proposed solutions assume all participants act “semi-honest”, which means participants may neither stop the protocol execution nor fake database content. In this contribution, we focus on a malicious participant behavior and prove that an atomic exchange of common data is not possible under the assumption of malicious participants. However, we propose mechanisms that not only reduce the damage in case a participant alters the exchange protocol, but also give a means to impede database content faking.


Atomic Exchange Common Data Exchange Protocol Oblivious Transfer Information Unit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Böttcher
    • 1
  • Sebastian Obermeier
    • 1
  1. 1.University of PaderbornPaderbornGermany

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