A Simple Argumentation Based Contract Enforcement Mechanism

  • Nir Oren
  • Alun Preece
  • Timothy J. Norman
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4149)


Agents may choose to ignore contract violations if the costs of enforcing the contract exceed the compensation they would receive. In this paper we provide an argumentation based framework for agents to both decide whether to enforce a contract, and to undertake contract enforcement actions. The framework centers around the agent reasoning about what arguments to put forth based on a comparison between the utility it would gain for proving its case and the utility it loses for probing environment state.


Service Level Agreement Monitoring Cost Argumentation Framework Contract Enforcement Dialogue Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nir Oren
    • 1
  • Alun Preece
    • 1
  • Timothy J. Norman
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computing ScienceUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenScotland

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