Risk-Bounded Formation of Fuzzy Coalitions Among Service Agents

  • Bastian Blankenburg
  • Minghua He
  • Matthias Klusch
  • Nicholas R. Jennings
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4149)


Cooperative autonomous agents form coalitions in order to share and combine resources and services to efficiently respond to market demands. With the variety of resources and services provided online today, there is a need for stable and flexible techniques to support the automation of agent coalition formation in this context. This paper describes an approach to the problem based on fuzzy coalitions. Compared with a classic cooperative game with crisp coalitions (where each agent is a full member of exactly one coalition), an agent can participate in multiple coalitions with varying degrees of involvement. This gives the agents more freedom and flexibility, allowing them to make full use of their resources, thus maximising utility, even if only comparatively small coalitions are formed. An important aspect of our approach is that the agents can control and bound the risk caused by the possible failure or default of some partner agents by spreading their involvement in diverse coalitions.


Probability Density Function Membership Degree Coalition Formation Coalition Structure Payoff Distribution 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bastian Blankenburg
    • 1
  • Minghua He
    • 2
  • Matthias Klusch
    • 1
  • Nicholas R. Jennings
    • 2
  1. 1.German Research Center for Artificial IntelligenceSaarbrückenGermany
  2. 2.School of Electronics and Computer ScienceUniversity of SouthamptonSouthamptonUK

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