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Low Latency Anonymity with Mix Rings

  • Matthew Burnside
  • Angelos D. Keromytis
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4176)

Abstract

We introduce mix rings, a novel peer-to-peer mixnet architecture for anonymity that yields low-latency networking compared to existing mixnet architectures. A mix ring is a cycle of continuous-time mixes that uses carefully coordinated cover traffic and a simple fan-out mechanism to protect the initiator from timing analysis attacks. Key features of the mix ring architecture include decoupling path creation from data transfer, and a mechanism to vary the cover traffic rate over time to prevent bandwidth overuse. We analyze the architecture with respect to other peer-to-peer anonymity systems – onion routing and batching mixnets – and we use simulation to demonstrate performance advantages of nearly 40% over batching mixnets while protecting against a wider variety of adversaries than onion routing.

Keywords

Exit Point Threat Model Anonymous Communication Reply Block Anonymizing Network 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matthew Burnside
    • 1
  • Angelos D. Keromytis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceColumbia University 

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