Client and Server Anonymity Preserving in P2P Networks

  • Byungryong Kim
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4185)


The participating nodes exchange information without knowing who is the original sender in P2P networks of basic form. Packets are relayed through the adjacent nodes and do not contain identity information about the sender. Since these packets are passed through a dynamically-formed path and since the final destination is not known until the last time, it is impossible to know who has sent it in the beginning and who will be the final recipient. The anonymity, however, breaks down at download/upload time because the IP address of the host from which the data is downloaded can be known to the outside. We propose a technique to provide anonymity for both the client and the server node in unstructured/structured P2P network. A random node along the path between the client and the server node is selected as an agent node and works as a proxy: the client will see it as the server and the server looks at it as the client, hence protecting the identity of the client and the server from each other.


Relay Node Distribute Hash Table Server Node File Sharing Inverted List 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Byungryong Kim
    • 1
  1. 1.DongBang Data Technonogy Co., Ltd.SeoulKorea

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