ECGSC: Elliptic Curve Based Generalized Signcryption

  • Yiliang Han
  • Xiaoyuan Yang
  • Ping Wei
  • Yuming Wang
  • Yupu Hu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4159)


Signcryption is a new cryptographic primitive that simultaneously fulfills both the functions of signature and encryption. The definition of Generalized Signcryption is proposed in the paper firstly. Generalized signcryption has a special feature that provides confidentiality or authenticity separately under the condition of specific inputs. Based on ECDSA, a signcryption scheme called ECGSC is designed. It will be equivalent to an AtE(OTP $, MAC) encryption scheme or ECDSA when one of party is absent. A third party can verify the signcryption text publicly in the method of ECDSA. Security properties are proven based on Random Oracle mode: confidentiality (CUF-CPA), unforgeability (UF-CMA) and non-repudiation. Compared with the others, ECGSC presents a 78% reduction in computational cost for typical security parameters for high level security applications.


Hash Function Elliptic Curve Encryption Scheme Signature Scheme Block Cipher 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yiliang Han
    • 1
    • 2
  • Xiaoyuan Yang
    • 1
  • Ping Wei
    • 1
  • Yuming Wang
    • 2
  • Yupu Hu
    • 2
  1. 1.Key Lab. of Computer Networks and Information SecurityEngineering College of Armed Police ForceXi’anChina
  2. 2.College of Communication EngineeringXidian UniversityXi’anChina

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