Modeling and Inferring on Role-Based Access Control Policies Using Data Dependencies
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) models are becoming a de facto standard, greatly simplifying management and administration tasks. Organizational constraints were introduced (e.g.: mutually exclusive roles, cardinality, prerequisite roles) to reflect peculiarities of organizations. Thus, the number of rules is increasing and policies are becoming more and more complex: understanding and analyzing large policies in which several security officers are involved can be a tough job. There is a serious need for administration tools allowing analysis and inference on access control policies. Such tools should help security officers to avoid defining conflicting constraints and inconsistent policies.
This paper shows that theoretical tools from relational databases are suitable for expressing and inferring on RBAC policies and their related constraints. We focused on using Constrained Tuple-Generating Dependencies (CTGDs), a class of dependencies which includes traditional other ones. We show that their great expressive power is suitable for all practical relevant aspects of RBAC. Moreover, proof procedures have been developed for CTGDs: they permit to reason on policies. For example, to check their consistency, to verify a new rule is not already implied or to check satisfaction of security properties. A prototype of RBAC policies management tool has been implemented, using CTGDs dedicated proof procedures as the underlying inference engine.
KeywordsSecurity Property Access Control Policy Access Control Model Role Assignment Organizational Constraint
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Ramaswamy, C., Sandhu, R.: Role-based access control features in commercial database management systems. In: Proc. 21st NIST-NCSC National Information Systems Security Conference, pp. 503–511 (1998)Google Scholar
- 2.Sandhu, R.S., Coyne, E.J., Feinstein, H.L., Youman, C.E.: Role-based access control models. IEEE Computer 29(2), 38–47 (1996)Google Scholar
- 3.CERT/CC, U.S.S., magazine, C.: E-crimewatch survey. Technical report (2005), http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/ecrimesummary05.pdf
- 5.Bonatti, P.A., Samarati, P.: Logics for authorization and security. In: Chomicki, J., van der Meyden, R., Saake, G. (eds.) Logics for Emerging Applications of Databases, pp. 277–323. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)Google Scholar
- 6.Maher, M.J., Srivastava, D.: Chasing constrained tuple-generating dependencies. In: PODS, pp. 128–138. ACM Press, New York (1996)Google Scholar
- 11.Gavrila, S.I., Barkley, J.F.: Formal specification for role based access control user/role and role/role relationship management. In: ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control, pp. 81–90 (1998)Google Scholar
- 14.Halpern, J.Y., Weissman, V.: Using first-order logic to reason about policies. In: CSFW, pp. 187–201. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2003)Google Scholar
- 15.Sandhu, R.S., Munawer, Q.: The arbac99 model for administration of roles. In: ACSAC, pp. 229–240. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (1999)Google Scholar