Dynamic Access Control in a Concurrent Object Calculus

  • Avik Chaudhuri
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4137)


We develop a variant of Gordon and Hankin’s concurrent object calculus with support for flexible access control on methods. We investigate safe administration and access of shared resources in the resulting language. Specifically, we show a static type system that guarantees safe manipulation of objects with respect to dynamic specifications, where such specifications are enforced via access changes on the underlying methods at runtime. By labeling types with secrecy groups, we show that well-typed systems preserve their secrets amidst dynamic access control and untrusted environments.


Access Control Type System Access Control Mechanism Evaluation Context Method Body 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Avik Chaudhuri
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of CaliforniaSanta Cruz

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