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Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Selfish Users with Elastic Demands

  • George Karakostas
  • Stavros G. Kolliopoulos
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4112)

Abstract

We examine how to induce selfish heterogeneous users in a multicommodity network to reach an equilibrium that minimizes the social cost. In the absence of centralized coordination, we use the classical method of imposing appropriate taxes (tolls) on the edges of the network. We significantly generalize previous work [20,13,9] by allowing user demands to be elastic. In this setting the demand of a user is not fixed a priori but it is a function of the routing cost experienced, a most natural assumption in traffic and data networks.

Keywords

Complementarity Problem Elastic Demand Optimal Taxis Congestion Game User Class 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Karakostas
    • 1
  • Stavros G. Kolliopoulos
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computing and SoftwareMcMaster University 
  2. 2.Department of Informatics and TelecommunicationsUniversity of Athens 

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