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Breaking the ICE – Finding Multicollisions in Iterated Concatenated and Expanded (ICE) Hash Functions

  • Jonathan J. Hoch
  • Adi Shamir
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4047)

Abstract

The security of hash functions has recently become one of the hottest topics in the design and analysis of cryptographic primitives. Since almost all the hash functions used today (including the MD and SHA families) have an iterated design, it is important to study the general security properties of such functions. At Crypto 2004 Joux showed that in any iterated hash function it is relatively easy to find exponential sized multicollisions, and thus the concatenation of several hash functions does not increase their security. However, in his proof it was essential that each message block is used at most once. In 2005 Nandi and Stinson extended the technique to handle iterated hash functions in which each message block is used at most twice. In this paper we consider the general case and prove that even if we allow each iterated hash function to scan the input multiple times in an arbitrary expanded order, their concatenation is not stronger than a single function. Finally, we extend the result to tree-based hash functions with arbitrary tree structures.

Keywords

Hash functions iterated hash functions tree based hash functions multicollisions cryptanalysis 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan J. Hoch
    • 1
  • Adi Shamir
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and Applied MathematicsThe Weizmann Institute of ScienceIsrael

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