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Trust Obstacle Mitigation for Database Systems

  • Victor Page
  • Robin Laney
  • Maurice Dixon
  • Charles Haley
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4042)

Abstract

This paper introduces the Trust Obstacle Mitigation Model (TOMM), which uses the concept of trust assumptions to derive security obstacles, and the concept of misuse cases to model obstacles. The TOMM allows a development team to anticipate malicious behaviour with respect to the operational database application and to document a priori how this malicious behaviour should be mitigated.

Keywords

Database System Security Requirement Development Team Activity Diagram Malicious Behaviour 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Victor Page
    • 1
  • Robin Laney
    • 2
  • Maurice Dixon
    • 1
  • Charles Haley
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computing, Communications Technology and MathematicsLondon Metropolitan UniversityLondon
  2. 2.Department of ComputingThe Open UniversityMilton Keynes

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