On the Price of Stability for Designing Undirected Networks with Fair Cost Allocations
In this paper we address the open problem of bounding the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs posed in . We consider the case where there is an agent in every vertex. We show that the price of stability is O(loglogn). We prove this by defining a particular improving dynamics in a related graph. This proof technique may have other applications and is of independent interest.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Minimum Span Tree Pure Strategy Social Optimum Congestion Game
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