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On the Price of Stability for Designing Undirected Networks with Fair Cost Allocations

  • Amos Fiat
  • Haim Kaplan
  • Meital Levy
  • Svetlana Olonetsky
  • Ronen Shabo
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4051)

Abstract

In this paper we address the open problem of bounding the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs posed in [1]. We consider the case where there is an agent in every vertex. We show that the price of stability is O(loglogn). We prove this by defining a particular improving dynamics in a related graph. This proof technique may have other applications and is of independent interest.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Minimum Span Tree Pure Strategy Social Optimum Congestion Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amos Fiat
    • 1
  • Haim Kaplan
    • 1
  • Meital Levy
    • 1
  • Svetlana Olonetsky
    • 1
  • Ronen Shabo
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceTel-Aviv UniversityIsrael

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