Supplementing an account of actions offered by Horty and Belnap [8] makes it more suitable for use in deontic logic. I introduce a new tense operator, for a while in the immediate future, provide for action terms as well as action formulas, and introduce an intention function into our models. With these changes, we are able to (a) explore means/ends relations involving actions, (b) make room for one agent to enable another to act, and (c) provide a means for distinguishing intended from unintended consequences. In combination, these improvements make it possible to consider collaborative action aimed at a goal, within a setting open to detailed normative scrutiny of ends, means, actions and intentions.


Negative Condition Atomic Formula Logical Truth Deontic Logic Philosophical Logic 
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark A. Brown
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentSyracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

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