Addressing Moral Problems Through Practical Reasoning

  • Katie Atkinson
  • Trevor Bench-Capon
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4048)


In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions.


Practical Reasoning Critical Question Moral Norm Argument Scheme Moral Problem 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Katie Atkinson
    • 1
  • Trevor Bench-Capon
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of LiverpoolLiverpoolUK

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