Addressing Moral Problems Through Practical Reasoning
In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions.
KeywordsPractical Reasoning Critical Question Moral Norm Argument Scheme Moral Problem
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