Dynamic Matching Markets and Voting Paths
We consider a matching market, in which the aim is to maintain a popular matching between a set of applicants and a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list that ranks some subset of acceptable posts. The setting is dynamic: applicants and posts can enter and leave the market, and applicants can also change their preferences arbitrarily. After any change, the current matching may no longer be popular, in which case, we are required to update it. However, our model demands that we can switch from one matching to another only if there is consensus among the applicants to agree to the switch. Hence, we need to update via a voting path, which is a sequence of matchings, each more popular than its predecessor, that ends in a popular matching. In this paper, we show that, as long as some popular matching exists, there is a 2-step voting path from any given matching to some popular matching. Furthermore, given any popular matching, we show how to find a shortest-length such voting path in linear time.
KeywordsLinear Time Maximum Match Stable Match Preference List Blocking Pair
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