An Extension to Bellare and Rogaway (1993) Model: Resetting Compromised Long-Term Keys
A security proof in the Bellare–Rogaway model and the random oracle model is provided for a protocol closely based on one originally proposed by Boyd (1996), which enjoys some remarkable efficiency properties. The model is extended so that it can detect a known weakness of the protocol that cannot be captured in the original model. An alternative protocol is proposed, provably secure in the extended model and the random oracle model, and offering the same efficiency features as the original protocol. Moreover, our alternative protocol provides key confirmation and forward secrecy. It also allows session keys to be renewed in subsequent sessions without the server’s further involvement even in the event that the long-term key or the earlier session key have been compromised.
KeywordsEncryption Scheme Random Oracle Security Parameter Security Proof Random Oracle Model
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