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Cache Based Power Analysis Attacks on AES

  • Jacques Fournier
  • Michael Tunstall
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4058)

Abstract

This paper describes possible attacks against software implementations of AES running on processors with cache mechanisms, particularly in the case of smart cards. These attacks are based on side-channel information gained by observing cache hits and misses in the current drawn by the smart card. Two different attacks are described. The first is a combination of ideas proposed in [2] and [11] to produce an attack that only requires the manipulation of the plain text and the observation of the current. The second is an attack based on specific implementations of the xtime function [10]. These attacks are shown to also work against algorithms using Boolean data masking techniques as a DPA countermeasure.

Keywords

Smart Card Clock Cycle Advance Encryption Standard Plain Text Cache Line 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jacques Fournier
    • 1
    • 2
  • Michael Tunstall
    • 3
  1. 1.Computer LaboratoryUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK
  2. 2.Security Technologies DepartmentGemplus Card InternationalLa CiotatFrance
  3. 3.Smart Card Centre, Information Security Group, Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEghamUK

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