Advertisement

A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments

  • Makoto Yokoo
  • Vincent Conitzer
  • Tuomas Sandholm
  • Naoki Ohta
  • Atsushi Iwasaki
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4012)

Abstract

Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various solution concepts (such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting false names (one acting as many), collusion (many acting as one), and the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we introduce a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust to these manipulations. We show that the anonymity-proof core is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing these conditions, we obtain a concept called the least anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to be non-empty.

Keywords

Characteristic Function Mechanism Designer Outcome Function Solution Concept Coalition Formation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T.: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. In: Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Acapulco, Mexico, pp. 613–618 (2003)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T.: Computing Shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains. In: Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), San Jose, CA, USA, pp. 219–225 (2004)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Gillies, D.: Some theorems on n-person games, PhD thesis, Princeton University, Department of Mathematics (1953)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Ketchpel, S.: Forming Coalitions in the Face of Uncertain Rewards. In: Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Seattle, WA, pp. 414–419 (1994)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Schmeidler, D.: The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics Journal of Applied Mathematics 17, 1163–1170 (1969)MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Shapley, L.S.: A Value for n-Person Games. In: Kuhn, H.W., Tucker, A.W. (eds.) Contributions to the Theory of Games. Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28, vol. 2, pp. 307–317. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1953)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Shehory, O., Kraus, S.: Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation. Artificial Intelligence 101(1–2), 165–200 (1998)MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    von Neumann, J., Morgenstein, O.: Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1947)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: The Effect of False-name Bids in Combinatorial Auctions: New Fraud in Internet Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 46(1), 174–188 (2004)MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Zlotkin, G., Rosenschein, J.S.: Coalition, Cryptography and Stability: Mechanisms for Coalition Formation in Task Oriented Domains. In: Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Seattle, WA, pp. 432–437 (1994)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Makoto Yokoo
    • 1
  • Vincent Conitzer
    • 2
  • Tuomas Sandholm
    • 2
  • Naoki Ohta
    • 1
  • Atsushi Iwasaki
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Information Science and Electrical EngineeringKyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan
  2. 2.Computer Science DepartmentCarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA

Personalised recommendations