Grand Canonical Minority Games with Variable Strategy Spaces

  • Hiromichi Kimura
  • Eizo Akiyama
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4012)


A simplified model of an economic market is the minority game. In each round players choose to join one of two sides, –1 or 1. Those on the minority side at the end of a round earn a positive point. The players make decisions about the alternative based on the past data.

The aim of our paper is to investigate what occurs in a modified minority game which involves two features as follows:

– the change of the number of attendees and

– the evolution of agents’ strategies.

In such a naturally extended minority game, we found that the probability density function(PDF) of price changes in our model mostly follows Gaussian function. However the PDF of price changes in real markets is known for not being Gaussian function. This result implies that we may have to modify the setteings of minority games.


Volume Change Probability Distribution Function Gaussian Function Price Change Real Market 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hiromichi Kimura
    • 1
  • Eizo Akiyama
    • 1
  1. 1.University of TsukubaTsukubaJapan

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