Abstract
A simplified model of an economic market is the minority game. In each round players choose to join one of two sides, –1 or 1. Those on the minority side at the end of a round earn a positive point. The players make decisions about the alternative based on the past data.
The aim of our paper is to investigate what occurs in a modified minority game which involves two features as follows:
– the change of the number of attendees and
– the evolution of agents’ strategies.
In such a naturally extended minority game, we found that the probability density function(PDF) of price changes in our model mostly follows Gaussian function. However the PDF of price changes in real markets is known for not being Gaussian function. This result implies that we may have to modify the setteings of minority games.
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Kimura, H., Akiyama, E. (2006). Grand Canonical Minority Games with Variable Strategy Spaces. In: Washio, T., Sakurai, A., Nakajima, K., Takeda, H., Tojo, S., Yokoo, M. (eds) New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. JSAI 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4012. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11780496_32
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11780496_32
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