Running Contracts with Defeasible Commitment

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4031)


Real life contracts imply commitments which are active during their running window, with effects on both normal runs as well as in the case of exceptions. We have defined defeasible commitment machines (DCMs) to provide more flexibility. As an extension to the task dependency model for the supply chain we propose the commitment dependency network (CDN) to monitor contracts between members of the supply chain. The workings of the DCMs in the CDN is shown by a simple scenario with supplier, producer, and consumer.


Multi-agent systems Autonomous agents Internet applications 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceTechnical University of Cluj-NapocaCluj-NapocaRomania

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