An Infrastructure Supporting Secure Internet Routing

  • Stephen Kent
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4043)


The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] is the foundation of inter-domain Internet routing. A number of papers have described how BGP is highly vulnerable to a wide range of attacks [2, 3], and several proposals have been offered to secure BGP [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Most of these proposed mechanisms rely on a PKI, to provide trusted inputs for routing security mechanisms, to enable BGP routers to reject bogus routing advertisements. This paper provides a detailed proposal for a PKI, including a repository system, representing IP address allocation and Autonomous System number assignment,. This infrastructure offers a near term opportunity to improve routing security, since it does not require changes to routers, while also setting the stage for more comprehensive BGP security initiatives in the future.


Address Space Border Gateway Protocol Validity Interval Address Allocation Address Block 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stephen Kent
    • 1
  1. 1.BBN TechnologiesCambridgeUSA

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